INDIA AND CHINA RACE TO BECOME THE NUMBER ONE ALLY OF MYANMAR

CHINA AND INDIA COURTING MYANMAR
FOR GOOD RELATIONS
ZHAO Hong


Executive Summary
1. On January 12, 2007, at the United Nations Security Council, China vetoed a
draft resolution tabled by the U.S. and UK, which called on the Myanmar
government to release all political prisoners.
2. India was also urged by the Bush Administration to be more active in pressing
for democracy in Myanmar after the Junta’s crackdown on the pro-democratic
movement led by monks in September 2007, but New Delhi calls “democracy
and human rights internal Myanmar issues”.
3. China’s and India’s stances on the Myanmar issue are based on their strategic
thinking in this country. China has since the late 1980s been heavily involved
in Myanmar strategically and economically. Myanmar is not only a potential
supply route bypassing the Malacca Strait, but also a strategic staging point
for controlling access to Malacca Strait’s western approaches.
4. Myanmar is part and parcel of China’s strategic design to develop its western
region. Myanmar is the only passage for China to reach South Asia from
Yunnan and an important access to the Indian Ocean. Counter-narcotic
trafficking, money laundering and smuggling of arms are also important
issues for both countries.
5. The Indian government was particularly worried about the China-Myanmar
strategic links and the prospects of the Chinese navy gaining a foothold in the
Bay of Bengal. Myanmar’s location is central to strengthening India’s Look-
East policy, energy security and counterbalancing China’s influence in
Southeast Asia.
6. India’s growing interest in Myanmar could be seen in the shift in its low-key
policies in the 1980s and the early 1990s -- from an emphasis on human rights
and democracy to an emphasis on a pragmatic strategic policy toward
Rangoon.
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7. China and India’s competition is best manifested in the energy field.
Myanmar is rich in oil and natural gas. New large finds in three fields in the
Gulf of Bengal have sparked an intense bidding war among Bangkok, Beijing
and New Delhi. It was with PetroChina that Myanmar eventually signed a gas
export Memorandum of Understanding in early 2006.
8. Just before the pro-democracy protests were crushed in Myanmar this
September, the junta withdrew India’s status of preferential buyer of its
offshore natural gas fields and instead declared its intent to sell the gas to
PetroChina. India has thus lost an important diplomatic initiative to counter
Chinese influence in Myanmar.
9. However India’s current setback in the field of energy rivalry is unlikely to
dampen its attempts to compete with China in other fields, and win greater
cooperation from Myanmar over counter-insurgence efforts and establish a
stronger presence there.
10. Myanmar has been described as a “de facto Chinese client state”, “a virtual
Chinese satellite”, and also “a critical nexus in the China-Indian regional
rivalry”. Nevertheless, Myanmar is fully aware of the potential dangers of
being too close to China, and has been diversifying its foreign relations,
allowing itself to be courted by India, Russia and other big countries.
11. Although China’s leverage in Myanmar has been decreasing, it still enjoys a
privileged position there, particularly at the time when Myanmar is not
opened to the world. It would be unrealistic to expect Beijing to displace the
regime that is serving as a guarantor of China’s access to the Indian Ocean.